

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 24, 2012

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Timothy Dwyer, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Jonathan Plaue, DNFSB Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** LLNL Activity Report for Week Ending February 24, 2012

**DNFSB Staff Activity:** This week, staff members J. Shackelford and J. Anderson conducted a review of a classified experiment to be performed in the Plutonium Facility and also reviewed a number of related institutional safety basis topics. In addition, staff members Roscetti and Shuffler participated in two teleconferences with Livermore Site Office (LSO) and laboratory contractor personnel to discuss the response to the Board letter dated December 13, 2011.

**Plutonium Facility:** On February 17, 2012, LSO transmitted to the contractor comments on the 2011 annual update of the safety basis. LSO's review primarily focused on changes made to the safety basis and did not include extent of condition reviews (beyond an LSO assessment of the systems reviewed by the Board's staff) examining the derivation of safety function, functional requirements, and performance criteria for the credited safety systems. LSO identified a total of 121 comments on this annual update, including a number of comments related to observations provided in the appendix to the Board letter dated December 13, 2011. Large numbers of comments were generated in the following broad areas:

- Outdated or otherwise inaccurate references
- The role of the glovebox, inert gas system, and oxygen monitors to control hazards associated with pyrophoric materials
- Emergency management related plans and program information
- Engineering details and boundary definition of the toxic gas control system

LSO requested resolution of the comments no later than April 27, 2012. Separately, LSO expects to begin extent of condition reviews on the other credited safety systems in the near term, with the toxic gas control system expected to be conducted first in support of its anticipated near term startup. LSO intends to disposition any identified issues using the potential inadequacy in the safety analysis process.